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ABSTRACT: One of the most important reasons for the expansion of Eurosceptic parties is the worsening 
of the economic crisis. This and, more generally, the processes of globalization/denationalization have not 
had the same effects for all citizens; a new structural conflict, opposing the “winners” and “losers” of glob-
alization, has arisen. 
Usually the mainstream political parties tend to take the “winners’” side, while the peripheral parties tend 
to adopt a “loser’s”’ programme and to use Euroscepticism as a mobilizing issue; the electoral constituen-
cy of the Eurosceptic parties is therefore formed, above all, by the “losers” of globalization. 
The 2014 European elections represented an important turning point for the Eurosceptic parties; they ob-
tained an unprecedentedly large percentage of votes, but no “political earthquake”, “sweeps”, or “Eu-
rope’s populist backlash” occurred. The Eurosceptic parties have never been able to form a joint anti-
European front, because of their mutual mistrust. “He’s worse than me”, could be the statement that best 
epitomizes the relationships within the Eurosceptic right-wing camp.  
A further exacerbation of the economic crisis and/or the inability of the EU institutions in addressing it 
could lead such parties towards new and more considerable achievements. 
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1. Introduction 
 
Over the years, the issue of European integration has acquired greater salience. Be-
cause of the intensification and spread of the economic crisis, the media, politicians 
and scholars have devoted particular attention to two issues: the activities of the Euro-
pean Parliament (EP) which, more or less effectively, could tackle the effects of the cri-
sis and secondly the consequences of the enlargement process. This attention has of-
ten been expressed in unkind tones – Matteo Renzi, for instance, on presenting the 
agenda of the Italian Presidency of the Council to the EP, asserted: “if Europe took a 
selfie today, the image would be one of tiredness, resignation, and boredom (…) re-
gaining the European soul and the deep meaning of our being together is the great 
challenge (…) we have to regain an identity”. 
In this regard, Edoardo Bressanelli, referring to the 2004 European elections, noted 
the paramount role of “Europe” within party manifestos and platforms, especially tho-
se developed by right-wing, conservative, and new-populist forces (Bressanelli 2010; 
see also Scott and Steenbergen 2004 and Netjies and Binnema 2007); the European 
Union (EU), therefore, would have ceased to be a “sleeping giant”, in other words, an 
issue not covered by political parties (Van der Eijk and Franklin 2004).  
Nevertheless, turnout in elections has been decreasing since the 1979 European 
election, reaching its lowest rate of 43 per cent in 2009 and 2014. Voters, therefore, 
regarded European elections as “second-order” elections: public opinion accorded little 
importance to the outcome of these elections; the voters would punish governing par-
ties, while the opposition and protest parties would achieve their best results (Reiff 
and Schmitt 1980; Van der Eijk and Franklin 1996). Furthermore, citizens’ trust in Euro-
pean institutions has decreased. Examining Eurobarometer data, we observe that the 
EU and EP appear to be affected by a general loss of popularity; the percentages of re-
spondents who have a negative image of the EU and those who are against a European 
economic and monetary union with a single currency (EMU), the euro, have also 
steadily increased (Fig. 1). The “permissive consensus” toward European integration, 
which began to decline with the negative outcomes of referendums on European is-
sues – the rejections of the Constitutional Treaty in the French and Dutch referendums 
(2005), for instance – appears to be almost completely eroded. 
Against this background, one could have expected excellent performance by the Eu-
rosceptic parties in the 2014 European elections; according to Open Europe estimates 
(http://www.openeurope.org.uk/Content/Documents/140428_EP_Briefing_Open_Eur
ope.pdf), reported in the main newspapers of all European countries, the anti-EU, anti-
austerity, anti-immigrant and anti-establishment parties should have won 30.9 per cent 
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of the vote and 218 seats – “headlines of ‘earthquakes’ and ‘sweeps’”, observed Cass 
Mudde (2014), “were being printed by an impatient press that had been foretelling 
‘Europe’s populist backlash’ for almost a year”1.  
Due to the worsening of the crisis and its greater impact on the lives of citizens, the 
2014 European elections could have represented an important turning point for the 
Eurosceptic parties. However, what was the actual outcome? Did the Eurosceptic par-
ties truly achieve extraordinary election results? In the event that they did, were these 
results consistent throughout Europe? What consequences are likely to arise with re-
spect to the European integration process? 
This article intends to answer these questions; however, it is first necessary to focus 
on the nature and characteristics of the so-called Eurosceptic parties. 
 
Figure 1. Attitudes toward EU, European Parliament and EMU (EU 28)2 
 
Source: Elaboration of data from Standard Eurobarometer 70: Autumn 2008 - Standard Eurobarometer 80: Autumn 
2013. 
 
 
 
 
  
 
1
 Open Europe is a British independent think tank that considers the future direction of the 
European Union and, more generally, all aspects of EU policy. 
2
 I chose to analyse the trend of attitudes since 2008, when the crisis broke out. 
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2. The Eurosceptic parties 
 
The term “Eurosceptic parties” does not refer to a specific and particular family of 
parties, as might be the case for the Greens or the Communist parties; it instead in-
cludes those parties, generally holding different ideologies, objectives and programs, 
that share similar sceptical attitudes towards the EU integration project. Only a few of 
them, such as the Danish People's Movement against the EU (N.), are single-issue, anti-
EU parties; hence, as Conti and Memoli recognized (2012, 92), “a joint anti-European 
front is hardly discernible, and what really exists is a plethora of dispersed Euroscepti-
cal party stances”.  
Employing a rhetoric of Euro-contestation, i.e., criticizing the EU and/or problematiz-
ing aspects of European integration, is not sufficient to qualify a party as Eurosceptic – 
it appears that Eurosceptic language has become a sort of koiné for many parties. Fur-
thermore, party-based Euroscepticism and Europeanism do not represent two sides of 
the same coin; they should rather be considered as two poles on a spectrum that in-
cludes different types of both opposition to and support for European integration. This 
entails that party-based Euroscepticism (as well as Europeanism) may be more or less 
pronounced.  
In this respect, Aleks Szczerbiak and Paul Taggart have distinguished between two 
different forms of Euroscepticism: hard Euroscepticism, defined as “principled opposi-
tion to the project of European integration as embodied in the EU, in other words, 
based on the ceding or transfer of powers to supranational institutions such as the EU”, 
and soft Euroscepticism, defined as “opposition to the EU’s current or future planned 
trajectory based on the further extension of competencies that the EU is planning to 
make” (Szczerbiak and Taggart 2008b, 247-248). Nicolò Conti has extended this taxon-
omy by adding two different forms of Europeanism (and a neutral attitude): functional 
and identity Europeanism; in the first, “support to European integration can be re-
conducted to a strategy, serving domestic interests or a different party goal”; whereas 
in the second, “there is a principled support to the EU and European integration” (Conti 
2003, 17; see also Flood 2002, Kopecký and Mudde 2002 and Mudde 2012).  
Many Eurosceptic parties, moreover, adopt a populist political style or mentality and 
may therefore be properly considered populist parties. These parties generally criticize 
elite groups and the ruling classes; bestow a central role on their leader; produce new 
opportunities for a direct relationship between citizens and leaders; identify the figures 
of “imagined” enemies (the EU, immigrants, etc.), making them able to mobilise and 
polarise the electorate; and employ anti-political language (Mudde 2007; Campus 
2010). 
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Clearly, any party may change its stances on European integration over time, primar-
ily for strategic reasons.  
To define these stances as Eurosceptic or not, many scholars have considered par-
ties’ official documents – election manifestos; party platforms; and leader’s speeches 
(Szczerbiak and Taggart 2008a, 2008b; Volkens, Bara, Best and Budge 2013) – whereas 
others have preferred to appeal to expert judgment (Ray 1999; Marks and Wilson 
2000; Marks, Wilson and Ray 2002). 
The results of these two approaches, of course, do not always correspond with one 
another. Thus, to develop a list of the Eurosceptic parties that competed in the 2014 
European elections that is as detailed and reliable as possible, I compared the main 
analyses on the topic, beginning with Szczerbiak and Taggart (2008a)3. Four possible 
combinations came to light from this comparison: 
1. All scholars agree on classifying a party as Eurosceptic; 
2. Some scholars classify a party as Eurosceptic, whereas others, advancing strong 
arguments, do not;   
3. Some scholars classify a party as Eurosceptic, whereas others, who do not ad-
vance strong arguments, do not; 
4. Some scholars classify a party as Eurosceptic, whereas others do not mention it. 
The first case is not problematic; in the second, I decided to not include the party in 
the final list; in the third and fourth cases, I decided to gather further information 
through both the literature and the party website: the party was classified as Euroscep-
tic when I failed to find evidence to contradict classifying it as such4. 
 Table 1 presents the final list of the Eurosceptic parties developed according to the 
aforementioned criteria. The list should be understood as a “picture”, which is as clear 
as possible, of the current situation. Due to the difficulties associated with distinguish-
ing between soft Euroscepticism and the rhetoric of Euro-contestation, certain smaller 
Eurosceptic parties may have been not correctly excluded, and certain smaller parties 
that are not Eurosceptic may have not been correctly included. 
The list, which I believe may be further improved by other scholars, includes 62 par-
ties from 26 countries. The Eurosceptic parties are present throughout Europe; moreo-
 
3
 The others studies considered are: Conti 2004; Harmsen and Spiering 2004; Hartleb 2011; 
Mudde 2014; De Sio, Emanuele and Maggini 2014; Valbruzzi and Vignati 2014; Open Europe 
2014. 
4
 I am grateful to Luca Pinto and Marta Regalia (University of Bologna) and to Pawel Swidlicki 
(Open Europe) for providing me with the results of their analyses. 
I am also indebted to Lars Nord (Mid Sweden University) and Stanislaw Mocek (Collegium 
Civitas, Warsaw) for their support in classifying the Swedish and Polish Eurosceptic parties. 
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ver, no significant difference concerning the territorial distribution (Northern vs. 
Southern states), the date of EU accession (founding vs. new members), or old political 
and military cleavages (NATO vs. ex Warsaw Pact states) can be recorded (table 1). 
 
Table 1 - Eurosceptic political parties in EU member states, 2014 
Country Party 
1 AT FPÖ Freiheitliche Partei Österreichs Freedom Party of Austria 
2 AT EUStop EU-Austritt, Direkte Demokratie, 
Neutralität 
EU Stop 
3 AT REKOS Die Reformkonservativen The Reform Conservatives 
4 AT BZÖ Bündnis Zukunft Österreich Alliance for the Future of Austria  
5 BE Vlaams Belang Vlaams Belang Flemish Interest 
6 BG NFSB/НФСБ Национален фронт за спасение 
на България 
The National Front for Salvation of Bulgaria 
7 BG ATAKA Партия Атака Attack 
8 CY ΑΚΕΛ - ΑΚΕL Ανορθωτικό Κόμμα Εργαζόμενου 
Λαού 
Progressive Party of Working People 
9 CY ΕΛΑΜ/ELAM Εθνικό Λαϊκό Μέτωπο National Popular Front 
10 CZ KSČM Komunistická strana Čech a Mora-
vy 
Communist Party of Bohemia and Moravia 
11 CZ ODS Občanská demokratická strana Civic Democratic Party 
12 CZ Svobodni Strana svobodných občanů Party of Free Citizens 
13 CZ Usvit Úsvit přímé demokracie Dawn of Direct Democracy 
14 DE Die Linke Die Linke The Left 
15 DE AfD Alternative für Deutschland Alternative for Germany 
16 DE NPD Nationaldemokratische Partei 
Deutschlands 
National Democratic Party of Germany 
17 DE REP Die Republikaner The Republicans 
18 DK DF Dansk Folkeparti Danish People's Party 
19 DK N. Folkebevægelsen mod EU People's Movement against the EU 
20 EE EIP Eesti Iseseisvuspartei Estonian Independence Party 
21 EL SYRIZA Συνασπισμός Ριζοσπαστικής 
Αριστεράς 
Coalition of the Radical Left 
22 EL X.A. Χρυσή Αυγή Golden Dawn 
23 EL KKE Κομμουνιστικό Κόμμα Ελλάδας Communist Party of Greece 
24 EL ANEL Ανεξάρτητοι Έλληνες Independent Greeks 
25 EL ΛΑ.Ο.Σ/LA.O.S. Λαϊκός Ορθόδοξος Συναγερμός  Popular Orthodox Rally - G. Karatzaferis 
26 ES IU Izquierda Unida United Left 
27 ES BNG Bloque Nacionalista Galego Galician Nationalist Block 
28 FI PS Perussuomalaiset Finns Party 
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29 FR FN Front National National Front 
30 FR PCF Parti Communiste Français French Communist Party 
31 FR DLR Debout la République Arise the Republic 
32 FR LO Liste ouvrière Worker’s Struggle 
33 FR NPA Nouveau Parti anticapitaliste The New Anticapitalist Party 
34 HR HSP AS Hrvatska stranka prava dr. Ante 
Starčević 
Croatian Party of Rights dr. Ante Starčević 
35 HU JOBBIK Jobbik Magyarországért Mozgalom Jobbik 
36 IE SF Sinn Féin Sinn Féin 
37 IT M5S MoVimento 5 Stelle Five Star Movement 
38 IT LN Lega Nord Northern League 
39 IT FDI-AN Fratelli d’Italia-Alleanza Nazionale Brothers of Italy-National Alliance 
40 LT TT Partija Tvarka ir teisingumas Order and Justice 
41 LV TB/LNNK Tēvzemei un Brīvībai For Fatherland and Freedom 
42 NL PVV Partij voor de Vrijheid Party for Freedom 
43 NL SP Socialistische Partij Socialist Party 
44 NL SGP Staatkundig Gereformeerde Partij Dutch Reformed Political Party 
45 NL GroenLinks GroenLinks Green Party 
46 PL PiS Prawo i Sprawiedliwość Law and Justice 
47 PL KNP Kongres Nowej Prawicy Congress of the New Right 
48 PL SP Solidarna Polska United Poland 
49 PL RN Ruch Narodowy National Movement 
50 PT PCP Partido Comunista Português Portuguese Communist Party 
51 PT BE Bloco de Esquerda Left Block 
52 RO PRM Partidul România Mare Greater Romania Party 
53 SE MP Miljöpartiet de gröna The Green Party 
54 SE SD Sverigedemokraterna Sweden Democrats 
55 SE V Vänsterpartiet Left Party 
56 SE C Centerpartiet Centre Party 
57 SI SNS Slovenska Nacionalna Stranka Slovenian National Party 
58 SK SNS Slovenská národná strana Slovak National Party 
59 SK L'SNS Ľudová strana Naše Slovensko People’s Party - Our Slovakia 
60 UK UKIP United Kingdom Independence 
Party 
United Kingdom Independence Party 
61 UK Cons: Conservative Party Conservative Party 
62 UK DUP Democratic Unionist Party Democratic Unionist Party 
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3. The Eurosceptic parties’ performance in the European elections of 2014 
 
The establishment of a political group in the EP requires at least 25 members (MEPs) 
from seven different states; the groups are not organized by nationality, but by political 
affiliation. Forming or joining a political group is necessary for the parties because it 
ensures them access to additional funds, committee seats, chamber speaking rights 
and the opportunity to introduce draft proposals.  
A preliminary analysis of the Eurosceptic parties’ electoral performance can be per-
formed by considering the results achieved by those EP political groups that are typical-
ly considered to be Eurosceptic (Mudde 2014): the soft Eurosceptic European Con-
servatives and Reformists (ECR), the hard Eurosceptic Europe of Freedom and Direct 
Democracy (EFDD), and the European United Left/Nordic Green Left (EUL/NGL), which 
includes parties adopting both hard and soft Eurosceptic stances – the former include 
the Swedish Left Party (V), the French Communist Party (PCF) and the Czech Com-
munist Party of Bohemia and Moravia (KSČM). Finally, the Not-attached Members (NA) 
must also be included in the examination, as they are generally Eurosceptic (Szczerbiak 
and Taggart 2008b). 
Table 2 reports the electoral results obtained by the political groups from the first to 
the most recent European election (1979-2014). Clearly, nearly all of the political 
groups – especially the ECR and EFDD – have experienced numerous changes over 
time, at least before the 2009 elections; however, the comparison between the first six 
and the last two European elections must be made with extreme caution5. 
 
 
5
 From the 1979 to 1989 European elections, the British Conservative party (Cons:), the Ulster 
Unionist Party (prior to 1984) and the Danish Conservative People’s Party, were gathered to-
gether in the European Democratic political group (ED). In 1992, the ED dissolved because many 
of its members shifted to the European People’s Party group (EPP); in 1999 the former became 
a subgroup of the EPP, renamed EPP-ED group. Finally, due to David Cameron’s enterprising 
spirit, a new conservative group, called ECR, was founded in 2009. 
The EFDD, founded in 2014, is the heir to the Europe of Freedom and Democracy (EFD) group, 
formed just before the 2009 elections. This group derived from the Union for Europe of the Na-
tions (UEN) and the Independence/Democracy (IND/DEM) groups, which emerged from the Eu-
ropean Democratic Alliance (EDA) and Forza Europa (FE) – in the case of the former – and from 
the Europe of Democracies and Diversities (EDD) and the previous Europe of Nations (EDN) 
groups – for the latter (Maggini 2014). 
Most of the parties in the UEN, EDA and FE groups chose to shift to the EPP. For this reason, I 
decided not to include these groups in the data elaboration regarding the EFDD group. 
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Table 2 -  EP political groups 1979-2014 (percentage of MEPs; Constitutive Sessions)6 
  1979 1984 1989 1994 1999 2004 2009 2014 
EPP 26.3 25.3 23.4 27.5 37.2 36.6 36.0 29.4 
S&D 27.3 30.0 34.7 34.9 28.8 27.3 25.0 25.4 
ALDE 9.8 7.1 9.5 7.8 8.0 12.0 11.4 8.9 
ECR 15.4 11.5 6.6 
   
7.3 9.3 
EFDD    3.4 2.6 5.1 4.3 6.4 
EUL/NGL 10.7 9.4 8.1 4.9 6.7 5.6 4.8 6.9 
GREENS/EFA 
 
4.6 8.3 7.4 7.7 5.7 7.5 6.7 
NA 2.4 1.6 2.3 4.8 1.4 4.0 3.7 6.9 
Others 8.1 10.5 7.1 9.3 7.6 3.7   
Tot. 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100,0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
Eq 0.94 0.92 0.91 0.89 0.86 0.87 0.89 0.93 
Source: Elaboration of data from http://www.europarl.europa.eu/pdf/elections_results/review.pdf and 
http://www.results-elections2014.eu/en/election-results-2014.html. 
 
In 2014, the European People’s Party (EPP) remains the largest political group in the 
EP, despite considerable losses: in the European elections of 1999, 2004 and 2009, it 
obtained 37.2, 36.6 and 36.0 per cent of MEPs, while in those of 2014, it won only 29.4 
per cent. Thus, the gap between the EPP and the Progressive Alliance of Socialists and 
Democrats (S&D), which obtained the same percentage of seats in 2009 and 2014, has 
 
6
 European People’s Party: 1979-94=EPP; 1999-2004=EPP-ED; 2009-14=EPP. 
Progressive Alliance of Socialists and Democrats: 1979-84: SOC; 1989-2004=PES; 2009-
14=S&D. 
Alliance of Liberals and Democrats for Europe: 1979-84=L; 1989=LDR; 1994-99=ELDR; 2004-
14=ALDE. 
European Conservatives and Reformists: 1979-89=ED; 2009 and 2014=ECR. 
Europe of Freedom and Direct Democracy: 1994=EDN; 1999=EDD; 2004=IND/DEM; 
2009=EFD; 2014=EFDD. 
European United Left–Nordic Green Left: 1979-84=COM; 1989=EUL+LU; 1994=EUL; 1999-
2014=EUL/NGL. 
Greens-European Free Alliance: 1984=RBW; 1989=RBW+G; 1994=G+ERA; 1999-2014=G/EFA. 
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been narrowing. It follows that the distribution of parties within the 2014 EP is particu-
larly balanced (Eq=0.93)7. 
Together with the EPP, the Alliance of Liberals and Democrats for Europe group has 
suffered the worst decline in recent years: -0.6 percentage points (PP) in 2009 and -2.5 
PP in 2014. Conversely, from 2009 to 2014, the share of all Eurosceptic groups in-
creased: the ECR by 2.0, EFDD by 2.1, and EUL/NGL by 2.1 PP; even the NA members 
grew (by 3.2 PP) (Table 2).  
If, for the sake of argument, one were to sum the results obtained by the three Eu-
rosceptic groups and the NA members, we would have a total of 29.6 per cent of seats; 
a plurality not particularly far from the forecasts expressed by many opinion polls be-
fore the elections.  
To perform a more in-depth analysis, I also examined data on individual Eurosceptic 
parties (table 3). First, more than 30 per cent of these parties were not able to satisfy 
the electoral thresholds that most countries had selected8. Furthermore, they failed to 
achieve satisfactory results throughout Europe: many parties, such as the Freedom Par-
ty of Austria (FPÖ), Danish People's Party (DF), SYRIZA, the National Front (FN), Jobbik, 
Sinn Féin (SF), Five Star Movement (M5S), Order and Justice (TT), For Fatherland and 
Freedom (LNNK), Law and Justice (PiS), and United Kingdom Independence Party  (UKIP) 
achieved extraordinary success, but others, such as Flemish Interest (Vlaams Belang), 
ATAKA, Progressive Party of Working People (ΑΚΕΛ - ΑΚΕL), Civic Democratic Party 
(ODS), Left Block (BE), and Greater Romania Party (PRM) suffered painful defeats. The 
national contexts and political systems, therefore, appear to have played a pivotal role 
in affecting the electoral outcomes. 
As above, no considerable difference regarding the geographical location, the date 
of EU accession, or old political and military cleavages can be identified (table 3). 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
7
 The index of balance Eq has been calculated using the following formula: Eq = 1 
−
k∑ pj
2−1kj=1
k−1
, where k is the number of categories, p the frequency, and j the category = 1, 2, …, 
k. Eq varies from 0 (minimum balance) to 1 (maximum balance) (cfr. Marradi 1995). 
8
 Any election threshold established at the national level must not exceed five per cent.  
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Table 3 - Results of the Eurosceptic parties in the European elections of 2009 and 2014 
  
Country Party 
Political group  Seats (%) Difference  Seats Position 
2009 2014  2009 2014 2009-14 2009 2014 2014 
1 AT FPÖ NA NA  12.7 19.7 7.0 2 4 3 
2 AT EUStop - -  - 2.8 - - 0 6 
3 AT REKOS - -  - 1,2 - - 0 8 
4 AT BZÖ - -  4.6 0.5 -4,1 0 0  9 
5 BE Vlaams Belang NA NA  9.9 4.1 -5.7 2 1 10 
6 BG NFSB/НФСБ - -  - 3.1 - - 0 7 
7 BG ATAKA NA -  12.0 3.0 -9.0 2 0  8 
8 CY ΑΚΕΛ – ΑΚΕL UEN-NGL UEN-NGL  34.9 27.0 -7.9 2 2 2 
9 CY ΕΛΑΜ/ELAM - -  0.2 2.7 2.5 0 0  7 
10 CZ KSČM UEN-NGL UEN-NGL  14.2 11.0 -3.2 4 3 4 
11 CZ ODS ECR ECR  31.5 7.7 -23.8 9 2 6 
12 CZ Svobodni - EFDD  1.3 5.2 3.9 0 1 7 
13 CZ Usvit - -  - 3.1 - - 0 10 
14 DE Die Linke UEN-NGL UEN-NGL  7,5 7,4 -0,1 8 7 4 
15 DE AfD - ECR  - 7,1 - - 7 5 
16 DE NPD - NA  - 1,0 na na 1 10 
17 DE REP - -  1,3 0,4 -0,9 0 0  14 
18 DK DF EFD ECR  14,8 26,6 11,8 2 4 1 
19 DK N. UEN-NGL UEN-NGL  7,0 8,0 1,0 1 1 6 
20 EE EIP - -  na  1,3 na na  0  7 
21 EL SYRIZA UEN-NGL UEN-NGL  4,7 26,6 21,9 1 6 1 
22 EL X.A. - NA  0,5 9,4 8,9 0 3 3 
23 EL KKE UEN-NGL NA  8,4 6,1 -2,3 2 2 6 
24 EL ANEL - ECR  - 3,5 - - 1 7 
25 EL ΛΑ.Ο.Σ/LA.O.S. EFD -  7,2 2,7 -4,5 2 0  8 
26 ES IU UEN-NGL UEN-NGL  3,7 10,0 6,3 2 5 3 
27 ES BNG Greens-EFA UEN-NGL  2,5 2,1 -0,4 1 1 9 
28 FI PS EFD ECR  14,0 12,9 -1,1   2 3 
29 FR FN NA NA  6,3 24,9 18,6 3 23 1 
30 FR PCF UEN-NGL UEN-NGL  6,0 6,3 0,3 4 3 6 
31 FR DLR - -  1,8 3,8 2,1 0 0 7 
32 FR LO - -  1,2 1,0 -0,2 0 0 9 
33 FR NPA - -  4,9 0,3 -4,6 0 0  10 
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Country Party 
Political group  Seats (%) Difference  Seats Position 
2009 2014  2009 2014 2009-14 2009 2014 2014 
34 HR HSP AS
9
 - ECR  - 41,4 -  - 1 1 
35 HU JOBBIK NA NA  14,8 14,7 -0,1 3 3 2 
36 IE SF - UEN-NGL  11,2 19,5 8,3 0 3 4 
37 IT M5S - EFDD  - 21,2 - - 17 2 
38 IT LN EFD NA  10,2 6,2 -4,0 9 5 4 
39 IT FDI-AN - -  -  3,7 3,7 - 0  7 
40 LT TT EFD EFDD  12,2 14,3 2,0 2 2 4 
41 LV TB/LNNK ECR ECR  7,5 14,3 6,8 1 1 2 
42 NL PVV NA NA  17,0 13,3 -3,7 4 4 3 
43 NL SP UEN-NGL UEN-NGL  7,1 9,6 2,5 2 2 5 
44 NL SGP ECR ECR  6,8 7,7 0,9 2 2 7 
45 NL GroenLinks Greens-EFA Greens-EFA  8,9 7,0 -1,9 3 2 8 
46 PL PiS ECR ECR  27,4 31,8 4,4 15 19 2 
47 PL KNP - NA  - 7,2 - - 4 4 
48 PL SP - -  - 4,0 -  -  0  6 
49 PL RN na -  na 1,4 - - 0 9 
50 PT PCP UEN-NGL UEN-NGL  10,6 12,7 2,1 2 3 3 
51 PT BE UEN-NGL UEN-NGL  10,7 4,6 -6,1 3 1 5 
52 RO PRM NA -  8,7 2,7 -6,0 3 0  8 
53 SE MP Greens-EFA Greens-EFA  11,0 15,3 4,3 2 2 4 
54 SE SD - EFDD  3,3 9,7 6,4 0 2 5 
55 SE V UEN-NGL UEN-NGL  5,7 6,3 0,6 1 1 7 
56 SE C ALDE ALDE  5,5 6,5 1,0 1 1 6 
57 SI SNS - -  2,9 4,0 1,2 0 0  9 
58 SK SNS EFD -  5,6 3,6 -2,0 1 0 10 
59 SK L'SNS na -  na 1,7 -  na  0  11 
60 UK UKIP EFD EFDD  16,1 26,8 10,7 13 24 1 
61 UK Cons: ECR ECR  27,0 23,3 -3,7 25 19 3 
62 UK DUP NA NA  0,5 0,5 0,1 1 1 10 
Source: Elaboration of data from http://www.europarl.europa.eu/pdf/elections_results/review.pdf and 
http://www.results-elections2014.eu/en/election-results-2014.html. 
 
 
 
9
 In coalition with Croatian Democratic Union, Croatian Peasant Party, Bloc of United Pen-
sioners. 
Giovanni Barbieri, He’s worse than me: the Eurosceptic parties at the turning point 
 
109 
 
4. Explaining the Eurosceptic parties’ growth through the “new structural con-
flict” hypothesis 
 
One of the most important reasons for the expansion of Eurosceptic parties is likely 
the worsening of the economic crisis and its increasingly severe impact on citizens’ 
lives. As noted above, citizens’ trust in European institutions and their ability to face 
and address the crisis has declined; accordingly, both political élites and the main-
stream political parties have often been charged to be incompetent and self-
referential, whereas the peripheral parties, which are generally Eurosceptic, have 
achieved greater support10. 
However, the crisis and, more generally, the processes of globalization/denationa-
lization (which are closely related to the crisis itself), have not had the same effects for 
all citizens; a new structural conflict, opposing the “winners” and “losers” of globaliza-
tion, would seem to have arisen11. 
The “winners”, as clarified by Hanspeter Kriesi and other scholars in a study devoted 
to the transformations of party political systems (Kriesi, Grande, Lachat, Dolezal, 
Bornschier and Frey 2008, 5 and 8), “include people who benefit from the new oppor-
tunities resulting from globalization, and whose life chances are enhanced […], entre-
preneurs and qualified employees in sectors open to international competition, as well 
as cosmopolitan citizens”; the “losers”, on the other hand,  “are people whose life 
chances were traditionally protected by national boundaries. They perceive the weak-
ening of these boundaries as a threat to their social status and their social security. 
Their life chances and action spaces are being reduced […]. [They include] entrepre-
neurs and qualified employees in traditionally protected sectors, all unqualified em-
ployees, and citizens who strongly identify themselves with their national community” 
(ivi, 4-5 and 8).  
Kriesi has referred to this antagonism as a conflict between integration and demar-
cation, which comprise an economic and a cultural dimension. According to the author, 
these dimensions correspond to the two cleavages that structured electoral competi-
tion in the post-war period.  
 
10
 As recognized by many authors (see, for instance, Szczerbiak and Taggart 2008a, 2008b), 
Euroscepticism stances are primarily adopted by oppositional, peripheral and extremist parties, 
both on the left and the right wing. In this respect, Conti (2003), exploring the patterns of party 
positioning on the EU within the Italian party system, demonstrated that two dimensions of the 
party’s spatial positioning along the political spectrum – the left-right ideology and the core-
periphery divide – explain the parties’ attitudes toward European integration. 
11
 On this conflict, see the article by Segatori, also in this special issue. 
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The mobilisation of the new social movements in the late 1960s and early 1970s did 
not add new dimensions to the political space but altered the meaning of the cultural 
dimension, weakening the traditional moral and religious issues and emphasizing, on 
the contrary, issues such as environmentalism, peace and gender equality.  
Similarly, the integration-demarcation conflict remains embedded in a two-
dimensional political space, but the processes of globalization that occurred in the 
1990s transformed the meaning of the cultural dimension once again, emphasizing is-
sues such as European integration and immigration. On the economic dimension, 
therefore, a neoliberal, free trade position contrasts with a defensive, protectionist 
one; on the cultural dimension, an universalist and multiculturalist position is opposed 
to a position in favour of protecting national identity, culture and values. 
An empirical analysis of voters’ attitudes performed by Romain Lachat and Martin 
Dolezal (2008) provided evidence for the thesis advanced by Kriesi. Employing sophisti-
cated statistical models, the two scholars demonstrated that:  
- in the 1990s and 2000s, the strength of the relationship between economic and 
cultural attitudes is weaker than in the 1960s – this involves a greater diversifica-
tion among groups of voters’ attitudes; 
- the cultural dimension is characterized by the most salient oppositions; 
- the conflict between the “winners” and “losers” of globalization (the former repre-
sented by the well-educated and the social-cultural specialist and the latter by the 
less well educated and the unskilled workers) has become more substantial and sa-
lient than those rooted in traditional cleavages; 
- the “winners” typically hold economic and, especially, cultural attitudes of integra-
tion, whereas the “losers” generally express economic and especially cultural atti-
tudes of demarcation. 
Ultimately, the winners and losers constitute political potentials, which can – and 
have – been mobilized by both old political parties, which have been compelled to re-
position themselves within the political space, and new ones. Among the latter, one 
can include Alternative for Germany (AfD) and the Italian Five Star Movement (M5S). 
AfD, founded in 2013 by Bernd Luke, professor of Macroeconomics at the University 
of Hamburg, opposes the Euro, which it believes has undermined European integra-
tion, and calls for the return of the national currencies or the formation of smaller and 
more stable monetary unions (e.g., the “Northern Euro”); M5S, formed in 2009 by the 
comedian Beppe Grillo, attacks the traditional parties and professional politicians, calls 
for a national referendum on the retention of Euro, and seeks to activate “the potential 
‘protest energy’ widespread in a considerable section of public opinion” (Bordignon 
and Ceccarini 2013, 2). 
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As several studies have shown (Hooghe, Marks and Wilson 2002; Szczerbiak and 
Taggart 2008a; 2008b), the mainstream political parties tend to take the “winners’” 
side, while the peripheral parties tend to adopt a “loser’s”’ programme and use Euro-
scepticism as a mobilizing issue. Clearly, the parties of the radical left express different 
positions on European issues than those adopted by the parties of the populist right: 
the former oppose market integration, economic liberalization and open borders be-
cause of the threats they pose to the left’s national social achievements; the latter, 
though not neglecting economic issues such as leaving the Euro or abolishing the fiscal 
compact, are more seriously concerned by the threats to national identity caused by 
the European integration process and, more generally, by the opening of borders. It is 
no coincidence that the right-wing parties are primarily characterized by xenophobic, if 
not racist, stances or restrictive positions with respect to immigration. 
However, if the cultural dimension of the conflict between integration and demarca-
tion currently holds greater salience than the economic one, it follows that the populist 
right’s appeal to the “losers”’ fears (such as cultural liberalism, immigration, and Euro-
pean integration) will likely exert a greater influence on the mobilization of the “losers” 
than the protection of their economic interests advanced by the radical left (Kriesi et 
al. 2008). Several populist right parties have also begun to acquire a significant support 
among voters who were traditionally supporters of the left and even have expanded 
into territories characterised by the presence of a distinctive political sub-culture that 
has always fostered the success of left-wing parties. 
The small town of Hénin-Beaumont (27 thousand inhabitants), in the French region 
Nord-Pas-de-Calais, symbolises this transformation. Hénin-Beaumont has always been 
a blue-collar town and a traditional stronghold of the left; it has experienced tragic 
workers’ struggles, and since 1789, it has always been led by mayors from the leftist 
parties. However, in the local elections of March 2014, the National Front (FN) ob-
tained 50.3 per cent of the vote, becoming the largest party; Steeve Brios, a close asso-
ciate of Marine Le Pen, became the new mayor (Valli 2014). 
In Italy, beginning with the parliamentary elections of 2008, the Northern League 
(LN) began to expand even into the regions of Central Italy (the so-called ‘Red Belt’), in 
which the parties of the left have always enjoyed very high levels of support. In the 
2008 elections, the League obtained 4.4 per cent of the vote, and elected ten candi-
dates to Parliament. In the European elections in the following year, it obtained 7.3 per 
cent and one MEP; in the regional elections of 2010, it won 9.5 per cent and elected 
eleven councillors. In 2010, the League was the third-largest party after the People of 
Freedom (PdL), the main centre-right party, and the Democratic Party (PD), the main 
centre-left party (Barbieri 2012). 
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5. Conclusions 
 
If, as observed, the 2014 European elections represented an important turning point 
for the Eurosceptic parties, it is necessary at this point to offer an assessment of their 
performance. In this respect, it should be noted that the electoral results cannot be 
perceived in an unitary way, as they include both positive and negative aspects. 
Clearly, the Eurosceptic parties obtained an unprecedentedly large percentage of 
votes, but no “political earthquake”, “sweeps”, or “Europe’s populist backlash” – as 
predicted by an impatient press before the elections – occurred. While suffering a de-
cline of 5.1 percentage points, the EPP remained the majority group in the EP; the for-
mer Luxembourg Prime Minister, Jean-Claude Junker, leading candidate of the EPP, 
took charge of the European Commission; a new grand coalition of the EPP, S&D and 
ALDE will likely be formed. The Eurosceptic parties, therefore, will not have substantial 
authority within the EP. 
Furthermore, as previously highlighted, the Eurosceptic parties have never been able 
to form a joint anti-European front, because of both their different stances, purposes, 
and aspirations and, above all, their mutual mistrust.  
A detailed consideration of the negotiations that the various Eurosceptic parties, es-
pecially those in the right-wing camp, undertook to form the new EP groups may be ex-
tremely useful to clarify this issue. No extreme right or neo-fascist party, such as the 
Bulgarian Attack, the Greek Golden Dawn (X.A.) or the Hungarian Jobbik, has ever been 
allowed to join any EP group. The attempts made by Marine Le Pen, leader of the FN, 
and Geert Wilders, leader of the Dutch Freedom Party (PVV), to form a new political 
group, called the European Alliance for Freedom (EFA), failed. The two most prominent 
figures in the potential alliance managed to ally with the Freedom Party of Austria 
(FPÖ), the Italian Northern League (LN), and the Belgian Flemish Interest (Vlaams Bel-
ang) but were unable to secure the necessary support of two additional parties. The 
negotiations opened by the FN with the Polish Congress of the New Right (KNP) were 
quickly interrupted by Wilders, who deemed the misogynistic and anti-Semitic posi-
tions of its leader, Janusz Korwin-Mikke, intolerable; speaking at a party rally held in 
The Hague, the capital city of the province of South Holland and the seat of govern-
ment in the Netherlands, on May 22, 2014, Wilders said: “The Freedom Party wants to 
form a parliamentary group but not at any price”; he added that cooperating with the 
KNP would have been “a bridge too far”. The defection of Angel Dschambaski, MEP of 
the Bulgarian National Movement (BND), also contributed to the failure of the pro-
posed alliance. 
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Nigel Farage, leader of the United Kingdom Independence Party (UKIP), by contrast, 
was able to form the EFDD group, which is, however, the smallest political group in the 
EP and has MEPs – one of whom is Joëlle Bergeron, an FN defector – from only seven 
member states. Moreover, two parties from the ex-EFD group, the Danish People's Par-
ty (DF) and the Finns Party (PS), preferred to join the ECR group. In the first official 
EFDD meeting after the elections, Farage declared that he would not accept the possi-
ble future entry of those parties that supported the formation of the EFA group.   
Thus, it would appear that each Eurosceptic party has a rather negative opinion of its 
fellow Eurosceptic parties; in particular, the centre-right parties consider the right par-
ties to be extremists, and neither wishes to have anything to do with the far-right and 
neo-fascist parties. “He’s worse than me”, could be the statement that best epitomizes 
the relationships within the Eurosceptic right-wing camp.  
It should be noted, however, that several Eurosceptic parties, such as the DF, Syriza, 
the FN, and the UKIP, received the most votes in their respective countries in the Euro-
pean election, and others, such as the Italian Five Star Movement (M5S), the Latvian 
For Fatherland and Freedom (LNNK), and the Polish Law and Justice (PiS), reached sec-
ond place. It would appear, therefore, that these parties were able to move away from 
the niche positions they have typically held in the electoral market and, thereby, be-
came influential players in the national political arena. In pursuing their goals, they will 
likely encounter fewer obstacles in the national arena than in the European one. Ac-
cordingly, the other parties will likely attempt to reposition themselves within the po-
litical space to check the Eurosceptics’ advance. The British Conservative Party, for in-
stance, shaken by the UKIP’s astonishing electoral growth, has recently adopted a Eu-
rosceptic tone, and its leader, Prime Minister David Cameron, decided to renegotiate 
the terms of Britain’s membership and hold a referendum on the withdrawal of the 
United Kingdom from the EU.  
In conclusion, the Eurosceptic parties do not appear to have passed the electoral 
test with flying colours, although their further success could just be postponed. As I 
have argued, the electoral constituency of these parties is formed, above all, by the 
“losers” of globalization; therefore, this implies that further exacerbation of the eco-
nomic crisis and/or the inability of the EU institutions in addressing it could lead such 
parties toward new and more considerable achievements. 
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